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  In	   the	  Grundrisse,	  Marx	  uses	   the	  English	  expression	  general	   intellect	   to	  define	  a	   form	  of	   social	  knowledge	   that	   has	   become	   a	   ‘direct	   force	   of	   production’,	   one	   that	   conditions	   ‘the	   process	   of	  social	   life	   itself’.1	  We	   can	   find	   similar	   concepts	   in	  Paolo	  Virno’s	   ‘transindividual	   thought’	   or	   in	  Gottlob	  Frege’s	  ‘mind-­‐independent	  thought’.2	  I	  would	  claim	  that	  the	  main	  feature	  of	  the	  general	  intellect	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  is	  its	  indeterminacy.	  Neither	  defining	  individuality	  nor	  a	  specific	  group,	  the	  general	  intellect	  represents	  a	  sort	  of	  passage	  between	  the	  singular	  and	  the	  multitude.	  In	  an	  article	  titled	  ‘The	  Ambivalence	  of	  Disenchantment’,	  Virno	  expands	  the	  Marxian	  notion	  of	  general	  intellect	  ‘well	  beyond	  the	  idea	  of	  knowledge	  materialized	  in	  fixed	  capital’.3	  The	  general	  intellect,	  Virno	   reminds	   us,	   ‘includes	   the	   epistemic	  models	   that	   structure	   social	   communication’	   and	   it	  ‘incorporates	   the	   intellectual	   activity	   of	   mass	   culture’.4	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   general	   intellect	  exemplifies	  the	  irresolvable	  tension	  between	  human	  nature	  and	  its	  place	  in	  society.5	  Until	  now,	  the	   discussion	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   general	   intellect	   has	   been	   the	   prerogative	   of	   economists,	  sociologists,	   philosophers	   and	   historians.	   I	   intend	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   this	   notion	   has	   also	  influenced	  the	  literary	  field,	  and,	  in	  particular,	  how	  the	  general	  intellect	  is	  an	  active	  element	  in	  the	  narration	  of	  Q,	  the	  novel	  written	  in	  1999	  by	  the	  writers’	  collective	  ‘Luther	  Blissett	  Project’.6	  
Q	  narrates	  a	  panorama	  of	  the	  historical	  events	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Europe	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Reformation.	   These	   events	   are	   seen	   through	   the	   eyes	   and	   the	   adventures	   of	   two	   opposite	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characters	  involved	  in	  a	  game	  of	  cat	  and	  mouse	  that	  lasts	  almost	  forty	  years.	  The	  story	  begins	  in	  Wittenberg	  in	  1519	  and	  ends	  in	  Istanbul	  in	  1555.	  One	  of	  the	  characters	  is	  a	  nameless	  student	  of	  theology	   in	  Wittenberg	  who	  becomes	   a	   heretic	   and	   is	   subsequently	   forced	   to	   live	   his	   life	   as	   a	  fugitive.	   He	   takes	   a	   different	   name	   for	   each	   place	   he	   reaches	   and	   every	   new	   community	   he	  encounters;	  the	  other,	  simply	  called	  ‘Q’,	  is	  a	  spy	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  Rome	  whose	  task	  is	  to	  identify	  and	   report	   all	   heretic	   activity	   in	   northern	   Europe.	   Q	   obeys	   the	   orders	   of	   the	   Archbishop	  Gianpietro	  Carafa,	  soon	  to	  become	  Pope	  Charles	  IV.7	  	  The	   complex—and	   always	   indeterminate—web	   of	   social	   and	   historical	   relations	   that	  constitutes	  the	  narration	  of	  Q,	  together	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  collective	  writing	  that	  lies	  behind	  its	  composition,	   illustrates	  Virno’s	  definition	  of	   general	   intellect,	   in	   that	   it	   tends	   to	   represent	   ‘the	  intellectual	  activity	  of	  mass	  culture,	  no	  longer	  reducible	  to	  simple	  labor,	  to	  the	  pure	  expenditure	  of	  time	  and	  energy’.8	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  Q’s	  general	  intellect	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  motor	  that	  propels	  the	   whole	   narrative.	   More	   specifically,	   I	   will	   show	   that	   proper	   names	   are	   the	   tools	   through	  which	  the	  general	  intellect	  is	  set	  in	  motion	  in	  the	  novel.	  Since	  the	  indeterminate	  characteristics	  of	   names	   in	  Q	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   the	   ‘multiple	   name’	   that	   has	   been	   the	   banner	   of	   the	  Luther	  Blissett	  Project	   (the	  collective’s	  signature	  has	  now	  changed	   into	  Wu	  Ming,	   ‘no	  name’	   in	  Chinese),	   my	   treatment	   of	   proper	   names	   may	   be	   attributed	   rather	   interchangeably	   to	   the	  characters	   in	  the	  novel	  and	  the	  multiplicity	  that	  hides	  behind	  the	  names	  of	  Luther	  Blissett	  and	  Wu	   Ming.9	   Both	   Q	   and	   the	   Luther	   Blissett/Wu	   Ming	   collective	   authors	   are	   clearly	  overdetermined	  by	  the	  use	  (or	  non-­‐use)	  of	  names.	  In	   an	   early	   review,	   Italian	   writer,	   activist	   and	   performer	   Bifo	   affirms	   that	  Q	   is	   ‘the	   first	  Italian	   novel	   (and	   even	   the	   first	   European	   one,	   as	   far	   as	   I	   know)	   handling	   the	   experience	   of	  libertarian	  and	  autonomous	  movements’.10	  He	  also	  writes	  that	  in	  Q,	  Communitarian	   mythology	   arises	   from	   the	   ashes	   of	   oral	   culture	   and	  overlaps	  with	   the	   critique	   of	   the	   Power,	   turning	   the	   critique	   into	   a	   new	  dogmatism	  and	  revolt	  into	  totalitarian	  power.	  This	  overlap	  is	  the	  origin	  of	  all	   the	   delusions	   that	   have	   tormented	   the	   proletarian	   community	   for	  almost	  five	  centuries.11	  	  If	  it	  is	  indeed	  true	  that	  Q	  describes	  this	  coincidence	  as	  ‘the	  origin	  of	  all	  delusions’,	  we	  must	  not	  think	  that	  the	  novel	  portrays	  the	  sixteenth	  century	  as	  its	  originary	  moment.	  Rather,	  the	  overlap	  follows	  a	  repetitive	  historical	  pattern	  without	  a	  specific	  spatio-­‐temporal	  point	  of	  departure.	  The	  narration	  of	  this	  pattern,	  together	  with	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  powerful	  and	  the	  subjugated,	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as	  a	  passage	  in	  all	  its	  details—movement	  included—is	  one	  of	  the	  pre-­‐eminent	  characteristics	  of	  the	  book.	  	  The	   dynamic	   quality	   of	   the	   novel	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   its	   characters,	  who	   lead	  double	  lives,	  hide	  under	  different	  names,	  and	  change	  their	  identity,	  professions	  and	  creeds	  with	  ease.	   The	   sense	   of	   passage	   is	   to	   be	   found	   also	   in	   the	   aimless	   itinerary	   that	   conducts	   the	  characters	   all	   over	   Europe	   and,	   in	   the	   epilogue,	   even	   outside	   its	   borders.	   The	   action	   unfolds,	  predictably,	   in	   the	   capitals	   of	   early	  modernity:	  Rome,	  Wittenberg,	   Strasbourg,	  Antwerp,	  Basel,	  Venice	   and	   finally	   Istanbul.	   Although	   the	   plot	   concentrates	   on	   the	   actions	   of	   two	   nameless	  individuals,	  the	  role	  of	  protagonist	  in	  Q	  is	  reserved	  for	  all	  historical	  conditions	  of	  movement	  and	  transformation:	   the	   heretic	   ferment	   of	   the	   cities	   of	   northern	   Europe;	   the	  web	   of	   printing	   and	  distribution	  of	  books;	   the	   increase	  of	  commercial	  routes	   into	  the	  New	  World;	   the	  conflicts	  and	  alliances	  among	   the	  Catholics,	   the	  Lutherans,	   the	  heretics,	   the	   Jews.	  Q’s	   general	   intellect,	   then,	  relates	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  characters	  to	  their	  continuously	  changing	  social	  environments.	   In	   its	  portrayal	  of	  a	  crucial	  moment	  for	  the	  history	  of	  Europe,	  Q	  conceives	  a	  genealogy	  (rather	  than	  a	  simple	   history)	   of	   the	   Reformation	   that	   includes	   the	   story	   of	   both	   the	   individuals	   and	   the	  multitudes	  that	  took	  part	  in	  it.12	  	  In	  order	  to	  emphasise	  the	  foundational	  notion	  of	  change	  and	  indeterminacy	  that	  underlies	  the	  whole	  narration,	  Q	   insists	   in	  presenting	   the	   indeterminate	  qualities	  of	   the	  proper	  name	  as	  best	   adapting	   to	   the	   perpetually	   transforming	   environments.	   For	   example,	   the	   Sephardic	   Jew	  whom	  the	  main	  character	  meets	   in	  Venice,	   João	  Miquez,	   talks	  about	  the	  transformations	  of	  his	  own	  name	   in	   these	   terms:	   ‘João	  Miquez,	   Juan	  Micas,	   Jean	  Miche,	   Giovanni	  Miches,	   or	   Zuan,	   as	  they	  call	  me	  here.	  There	  are	  as	  many	  versions	  of	  my	  name	  as	  there	  are	  countries	  that	  I’ve	  passed	  through.	   For	   the	   Emperor	   Charles	   VI	  was	   Jehan	  Micas.’13	   Borrowing	  Virno’s	   terminology	   once	  again,	  we	  can	  state	  that	  Q’s	  names	  are	   ‘transitional	  objects’,	   in	  that	  they	  represent	  the	  passage,	  
rather	  than	  the	  place	  of	   the	   individual	  and	  of	  the	  multitudes	   in	  history.14	  The	  insistence	  on	  the	  multiple	   referentiality	   of	   names,	   together	   with	   the	   stark	   contemporary	   language	   used	   in	   the	  book,	  illustrate	  the	  novel’s	  political	  stance:	  multiplicity	  is	  a	  more	  powerful	  historical	  agent	  than	  the	  singular	  individual,	  and	  relentless	  movement	  is	  the	  multiple	  individual’s	  inherent	  condition	  of	  existence.	  In	  the	  same	  passage	  quoted	  above,	  João	  Miquez	  continues:	  The	  advantage	  of	  having	  such	  an	  extended	  family	   is	   that	  you	  have	   lots	  of	  extra	  eyes	  and	  ears	  …	  you’ve	  got	  to	  move	  very	  fast.	  You’ve	  got	  to	  be	  faster	  than	   they	  are.	  You’ve	  got	   to	  blend	   into	   the	  crowd,	  have	  a	  goal	   to	  aim	  for,	  flatter	  your	  enemy	  and	  always	  travel	  light.15	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In	   its	   narration	   of	   a	   (repetitive)	   pattern	   of	  movement,	   and	   its	   insistence	   on	   the	   power	   of	   the	  multitude,	  the	  novel	  presents	  an	  obviously	  allegorical	  value.	  Within	  the	  history	  of	  the	  struggles	  that	  characterised	  the	  Reformation	  and	  the	  Counter-­‐Reformation,	  Q	  privileges	  specific	  motifs—the	  attack	  against	  the	  bankers’	  financial	  power,	  the	  history	  of	  heretic	  rebellion	  to	  the	  centralised	  power	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  Rome,	  the	  insurrections	  of	  the	  peasants	  in	  the	  German	  cities—which	  can	  be	   easily	   related	   to	   the	   strategies	   of	   more	   contemporary	   radical	   movements.	   It	   should	   not	  surprise	  us	   then	   to	   find	  out	   that	   critics	   and	   reviewers	  have	  underlined	   the	   adaptability	  of	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  plot	  can	  be	  easily	  adapted	  not	  only	  to	  contemporary	  history,	  but	  to	  any	  history	  of	  subversion	  taking	  place	  (especially	  in	  Italy)	  in	  the	  last	  forty	  years.16	  	  The	  allegorical	   reading	  of	  Q	   is	  necessarily	   rooted	   in	   the	  de-­‐signification	  of	  proper	  names.	  The	   novel	   uses	   names	   as	   indeterminate	   and	   de-­‐signifying	   objects	   to	   demonstrate	   crucial	  questions	  of	  identity	  and	  power	  relations.	  The	  de-­‐signification	  of	  proper	  names	  becomes,	  in	  this	  way,	   the	  general	   intellect	   behind	  Q’s	   complex	   structure.	  When	   the	  book	   reaches	   a	   closure,	   the	  main	  character	  makes	  the	  following	  comment:	  	  Details	  are	  escaping,	  the	  minor	  shades	  who	  populated	  history	  are	  slipping	  away,	   forgotten.	   Rogues,	   mean	   little	   clerics,	   godless	   outlaws,	   policemen,	  spies.	   Unmarked	   graves.	   Names	   which	   mean	   nothing,	   but	   which	   have	  encountered	   strategies	   and	   wars,	   have	   made	   them	   explode,	   sometimes	  stubbornly,	   as	   part	   of	   a	   deliberate	   struggle,	   at	   other	   times	   purely	   by	  chance,	  with	  a	  gesture,	  a	  word.17	  	  The	  multitudes,	   the	  narrator	   insists,	  end	  their	  days	  under	   ‘unmarked	  graves’,	  and	  their	  proper	  names	   ‘mean	   nothing’.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   their	   continuous	   transformation	   and	   ‘adaptation’	   is	  what	  creates	  movement,	  and	  passage,	  and	  what	  contains	  the	  potentiality	  (casual	  as	  it	  may	  be)	  of	  subverting	  the	  existing	  power	  structure.	  Such	  movement	  thus	  becomes	  the	  space-­‐in-­‐between,	  the	  locus	   of	   encounter	   between	   the	   individual	   and	   the	   multitude:	   neither	   separated	   entities,	   nor	  definable	  as	  an	  unshapely	  mass.	  In	  Q,	  the	  proper	  name	  undergoes	  a	  continuous	  paradigmatic	  change:	  it	  is	  not	  always	  related	  to	  a	  precise	  individual	  (author	  or	  character)	  but	  addresses	  instead	  a	  collectivity.	  It	  is	  commonly	  assumed	  that	  a	  proper	  name	  is	  a	  determiner	  of	   individuality,	  hence	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  boundaries	  or,	   to	   use	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	   definition,	   of	   ‘appropriative	   territories’.18	   Repeatedly	  transforming	   proper	   names	   therefore	   causes	   not	   only	   a	   confusion	   of	   identity,	   but	   also	   an	  unstable	   territorial	   condition.	   The	   lack	   of	   ‘singularity’	   and	   ‘identity’	   that	   results	   from	   the	  indeterminacy	  of	   names,	   then,	  manifests	   itself	   as	   a	   ‘missing	   space’.19	  The	  novel	   illustrates	   this	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indeterminacy	  every	  time	  a	  character	  changes	  his	  name:	  ‘Metzger,	  Niemanson,	  Jost,	  Boekbinder,	  Lot.	  The	  many	  and	  the	  one.	  The	  ones	  I’ve	  been.	  The	  many	  and	  the	  one.	  Someone.	  The	  man	  in	  the	  crowd.	   Hidden	   within	   the	   community.	   One	   of	   ours.’20	   In	   the	   all	   the	   works	   of	   the	   Luther	  Blissett/Wu	  Ming	  collective,	  though,	  and	  especially	  in	  Q,	  the	  lack	  of	  territory	  is	  always	  balanced	  by	   the	   wider	   potentiality	   of	   ‘occupying	   multiple	   spaces’	   that	   is	   offered	   to	   those	   who	   bear	  multiple	  names.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  multiple	  name	  allows	  its	  bearer(s)	  to	  live	  multiple	  lives,	  and	  necessarily	  speaks	  of	  perpetual	  motion.	  Or,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  characters	  comments:	  ‘Anyone	  without	  a	  name	  must	  have	  had	  at	  least	  a	  hundred	  of	  them	  …	  And	  a	  story	  worth	  listening	  to.’21	  None	  of	  the	  figures	  that	  lead	  the	  action	  of	  the	  story	  has	  a	  fixed,	  proper	  name.	  Those	  whose	  names	  are	  clear	  and	   recognisable	   are	   usually	   well-­‐known	   historical	   figures—Martin	   Luther,	   Pope	   Leo	   X,	   the	  Emperor,	  the	  Fugger	  family—but	  instead	  of	  having	  an	  active	  part	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  plot,	  they	   have	   the	   function,	   to	   paraphrase	   the	   affirmation	   that	   opens	   the	   book,	   of	   ‘background	  figures’;	  they	  deliver	  for	  the	  reader	  the	  spatio-­‐temporal	  context	  of	  the	  story.	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  the	  passage	  and	  the	  movement	  are	  always	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  nameless	  and	  of	  the	  multiple,	  never	  of	  the	  individual.	  Virno’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   general	   intellect	   relies	   upon	   the	   idea	   of	  anthropogenesis.	  Such	  a	  notion,	  Virno	  insists,	  is	  the	  real	  origin	  of	  Marxist	  discourse	  and	  rests	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  human	  being	  is,	  unlike	  all	  other	  species,	  an	  undefined	  animal.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  editors	  of	  Futuro	  anteriore,	  (a	  collection	  of	  interviews,	  articles,	  essays	  of	  the	  movimento	  
operaista),	  he	  states:	  	  Being	   a	   linguistic	   animal,	   man	   possesses	   a	   certain	   ratio	   of	   cognitive,	  intellectual	   life	   and	   sensitive	   life,	   and	   he	   does	   not	   belong	   to	   a	   clearly	  determined	   environment	   …	   but	   instead	   to	   an	   indeterminate	   world	   in	  which	   he	   can	   never	   find	   a	   specific	   direction.	   Hence,	   when	   we	   speak	   of	  relationality,	   of	   linguistic	   basis,	   and	   of	   man’s	   readiness	   to	   continually	  change	   and	   renew,	   we	   give	   our	   emphasis	   to	   the	   indefiniteness	   of	   the	  animal-­‐man.22	  Within	  the	  state	  of	  indeterminacy	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  primal	  constitutive	  element	  of	  humanity,	  then,	  the	  general	  intellect	  assumes	  a	  dual	  characteristic.	  Virno	  continues:	  	  [The	   general	   Intellect]	   is	   a	   productive	   resource	   of	   capitalism,	   it	   is	  knowledge,	   science,	   and	   the	   use	   that	   the	   human	   being	   makes	   of	   these	  faculties;	   it	   is	   also,	   obviously,	   the	   only	   concrete	   and	   defined	   source	   of	  transformation.	  In	  this	  sense	  it	  has	  a	  double	  face.23	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In	   the	   same	   collection,	   Bifo	   also	   answers	   a	   few	   questions	   about	   general	   intellect,	   addressing	  precisely	   its	   duality.	   He	   affirms	   that	  Marx’s	   reasoning	   on	   the	   constitutive	   elements	   of	   general	  intellect	   does	   not	   only	   rest	   on	   a	   political	   basis,	   but	   is	   instead	   a	   profound	   reflection	   on	   the	  composition	  of	  the	  social	  apparatus	  and	  its	  productive	  power.	  The	  general	  intellect,	  Bifo	  claims,	  ‘is	  the	  objective	  force	  of	  transformation	  of	  the	  capitalistic	  productive	  process’.24	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  indication,	  in	  Marx,	  of	  the	  subversive	  power	  of	  the	  general	  intellect	  per	  se,	  its	  potentiality	  is	  indeed	  implicit,	  rooted	  in	  its	  duality	  and	  indefiniteness,	  and	  inclusive	  of	  all	  subversive	  gestures	  tended	  to	   the	  transformation	  of	   the	  social	  and	  political	  reality.	  And	   if	   it	   is	   indeed	  true	  that	   the	  general	  intellect	  is	  a	  term	  that	  naturally	  applies	  to	  the	  multitude,	  we	  must	  not	  forget	  that	  Marx	  does	   not	   exclude	   subjectivity	   as	   the	   element	   that	   informs	   it.	   In	   the	   same	   fragment	   of	   the	  
Grundrisse,	  alongside	  the	  praise	  for	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  ‘general	  forces	  of	  the	  human	  mind’,	  is	  the	  need	  for	  ‘the	  development	  of	  the	  social	  individual	  which	  appears	  as	  the	  great	  foundation-­‐stone	  of	  production	  and	  of	  wealth’.25	  In	  other	  words,	  Marx	  specifically	  mentions	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  constitutive	  unit	  of	  the	  general	  intellect.	  	  
Q	   seems	   to	   be	   constructed	   on	   the	   duality	   inscribed	   in	   the	   notion	   of	   general	   intellect,	   not	  only	  because	  of	  its	  continuous	  shifts	  in	  focus	  between	  individual	  and	  collective	  history,	  but	  also	  for	   its	   reflection	   on	   the	   functioning	   (rather	   than	   the	   simple	   meaning)	   of	   individuals	   and	  multitudes	   in	   the	  constitution	  of	  social	  relations.	  Although	  the	  novel	   is	  constructed	  as	  a	  choral	  ‘painting’,	   a	   fresco	   of	   the	   history	   of	   the	   Reformation	   that	   includes	   a	   multitude	   of	   indistinct	  figures,	  its	  focus	  is	  always	  on	  two	  main	  individualities	  who	  are	  themselves	  multiple	  and	  strictly	  interconnected:	  the	  rebel	  and	  the	  spy;	  the	  power	  and	  its	  opposition.	  The	   frequent	   digressions	   on	   the	   causes	   and	   consequences	   of	   collective	   activities,	   for	  instance,	   together	  with	  the	   focus	  on	  the	  subjectivity	  of	   individual	  characters,	  suggest	   the	  strict	  relations	   between	   the	   general	   intellect	   and	  what	  we	   could	   call	   the	   ‘particular	   intellect’	   of	   the	  individual.	  Rather	   than	   solving	   such	   impasses	   imposing	   a	   choice	   (epistemological	   and	   ethical)	  between	  the	  two	  possibilities,	  Luther	  Blissett	  exemplifies	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  position	  that,	  close	  to	  Virno’s	  definition	  of	  the	  man-­‐animal,	   is	  strictly	  indeterminate;	  it	  comprehends	  the	  dualism	  and	  accentuates	   rather	   than	   reduces	   its	   contradictions.	   The	   general	   intellect	   in	   Q	   is	   the	   invisible	  passage	   between	   the	   collectivity	   and	   the	   individual,	   between	   proper	   and	   improper	   names,	  between	  storytelling	  and	  history.	  In	  conclusion,	  Q	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  indeed	  an	  intrinsic	  property	  of	  the	  general	  intellect	  to	  be	  both	  social	  and	  subjective,	  both	  determinate	  and	  indeterminate.	  Q	  is	  a	  collective	  novel,	  and	  its	  author	  is	  not	  a	  singular	  subject	  but	  a	  multiple	  name,	  a	  general	  intellect	  of	  its	  own.	  The	  link	  between	  the	  historical	  and	  the	  allegorical	  reading	  of	  the	  novel	  must	  therefore	  
Sabrina Ovan—Q’s General Intellect	   75 
find	  its	  point	  of	  departure	  in	  the	  conception	  of	  names	  as	  non-­‐defining	  and	  indeterminate	  entities	  
in	  and	  outside	  the	  novel.	   	  —	  Sabrina	  Ovan	  is	  a	  PhD	  student	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  Comparative	  Literature	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  University	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  Southern	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  Angeles.	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  trans.	  Martin	  Nicolaus,	  Vintage	  Books,	  New	  York,	  1973,	  p.	  706.	  The	  notion	  of	  general	  intellect	  has	  been	  the	  center	  of	  attention	  of	  most	  contemporary	  Marxist	  philosophers,	  especially	  in	  Italy,	  where	  the	  movimento	  operaista	  has	  taken	  the	  concept	  as	  the	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  the	  development	  of	  new	  conceptions	  of	  work,	  technologic	  development	  and	  the	  potentiality	  of	  subversion	  of	  the	  capitalist	  system.	  Marx,	  however,	  does	  not	  offer	  an	  explicit	  definition	  of	  the	  term,	  which	  appears,	  rather	  enigmatically,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ‘fragment	  on	  machinery’	  in	  the	  second	  volume	  of	  the	  Grundrisse.	  2	  See	  Gottlob	  Frege,	  Logical	  Investigations,	  trans.	  PT	  Geach	  and	  RH	  Stoothof,	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  New	  Haven,	  1977,	  p.	  32	  (footnote);	  and	  Paolo	  Virno,	  Quando	  il	  verbo	  si	  fa	  carne:	  linguaggio	  e	  natura	  umana,	  Bollati	  Boringhieri,	  Torino,	  2003,	  pp.	  111–39.	  Virno	  talks	  about	  ‘transindividuality’	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  durably	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  Q	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  in	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  novel.	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  on	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  his	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  many	  times.	  He	  is	  Gustav	  Metzger,	  shepherd’s	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  in	  Eltersdorf	  in	  1527.	  When	  he	  hits	  Strasbourg	  in	  1528,	  he	  is	  a	  merchant	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  Lienhard	  Jost.	  He	  is	  Gert	  ‘From-­‐the-­‐Well’	  during	  his	  participation	  in	  the	  events	  of	  Münster	  in	  1534,	  then	  Lot	  during	  his	  period	  of	  stay	  at	  the	  congregation	  of	  the	  Free	  Spirit	  led	  by	  Lodewijck	  Pruystinck	  in	  1538.	  He	  will	  bear	  the	  name	  of	  Lodewijck	  Pruystinck	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  when	  the	  latter	  is	  condemned	  and	  burned	  for	  heresy.	  In	  Venice,	  he	  is	  ‘messer	  Ludovico’.	  He	  is	  Tiziano	  the	  Baptist	  in	  1548.	  The	  epilogue	  of	  the	  book,	  then,	  sees	  the	  character	  ‘outside	  Europe’	  (as	  prophetically	  announced	  in	  the	  title	  of	  the	  first	  chapter),	  at	  the	  court	  of	  Soleyman	  the	  Great	  in	  Turkey,	  surrounded	  by	  other	  multiple-­‐named	  fugitives.	  His	  ‘Arab’	  name	  is	  Ishmael-­‐who-­‐traveled-­‐the-­‐world.	  8	  Virno,	  p.	  22.	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  9	  Luther	  Blissett	  is	  a	  fictitious,	  multiple	  identity	  (taking	  its	  name	  from	  a	  Jamaican	  soccer	  star)	  that	  may	  be	  adopted	  in	  any	  form,	  by	  anyone	  who	  wants	  to	  tell	  a	  story	  in	  a	  way	  that	  destabilises	  the	  ‘normative’	  constriction	  of	  the	  institutional	  publishing	  channels.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  trace	  a	  precise	  history	  of	  the	  Luther	  Blissett	  Project.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  ‘public	  appearances’	  of	  the	  multiple	  name	  is	  on	  2	  March	  1997	  (the	  activity	  of	  the	  collective,	  though,	  has	  started	  earlier).	  In	  order	  to	  undermine	  journalists’	  exploitation	  of	  stories	  on	  pedophilia	  and	  Satanism,	  Luther	  Blissett	  sent	  to	  the	  newspaper	  Il	  resto	  del	  carlino	  (Bologna	  daily)	  a	  series	  of	  fake	  confessions	  of	  Satanists.	  The	  joke	  was,	  at	  first,	  taken	  seriously.	  When	  the	  daily	  television	  news	  publicly	  declared	  the	  unreliability	  of	  the	  material,	  the	  whole	  inquiry	  on	  pedophilia	  (that	  had	  already	  sent	  two	  innocent	  people	  in	  jail)	  fell	  and	  revealed	  itself	  as	  without	  any	  foundation.	  What	  distinguishes	  the	  Luther	  Blissett	  Project	  from	  other	  communicative	  multi-­‐media	  experiments	  is	  the	  socio-­‐political	  character	  of	  the	  material	  they	  propose.	  Their	  expressions	  tend	  to	  political	  radicalism	  and	  they	  do	  not	  line	  up	  with	  any	  ideology,	  be	  it	  left	  wing	  or	  right	  wing.	  The	  press	  usually	  associates	  the	  collective	  with	  new	  cultural	  tendencies	  such	  as	  the	  anti-­‐globalisation	  movement,	  and	  to	  the	  (principally	  Italian	  and	  European)	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  centri	  sociali.	  10	  Franco	  Berardi	  (Bifo),	  ‘Gli	  ultimi	  romanzi	  del	  xx	  secolo’,	  DeriveApprodi,	  no.	  19,	  Spring	  2000,	  p.	  65.	  11	  Bifo,	  ‘Gli	  Ultimi	  Romanzi’,	  p.	  65.	  12	  See	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Society	  Must	  Be	  Defended,	  Lectures	  at	  the	  College	  de	  France,	  1975–76,	  trans.	  David	  Macey,	  Picador,	  New	  York,	  2003,	  pp.	  1–21.	  Foucault	  defines	  the	  term	  ‘genealogy’	  as	  the	  coupling	  together	  of	  scholarly	  knowledges	  and	  disqualified	  (or	  subjugated)	  knowledges.	  This	  method	  allows	  scholars	  to	  construct	  the	  historical	  knowledge	  of	  struggles	  and	  make	  use	  of	  that	  knowledge	  in	  contemporary	  tactics.	  	  13	  Luther	  Blissett,	  Q,	  trans.	  Shaun	  Whiteside,	  Harcourt,	  Orlando,	  2004,	  p.	  52.	  14	  See	  Virno,	  Quando	  il	  verbo	  si	  fa	  carne,	  p.	  119.	  Transitional	  objects	  are	  objects	  that	  allow	  reification,	  that	  is,	  the	  passage	  that	  connects	  two	  (or	  more)	  states,	  minds,	  human	  beings	  etc.	  It	  is	  the	  res	  intermedia	  that	  does	  not	  connect	  two	  already	  constituted	  individualities,	  but	  enables	  their	  constitution	  as	  distinct	  polarities	  at	  a	  later	  time.	  15	  Luther	  Blissett,	  p.	  524.	  16	  See	  Wu	  Ming,	  Giap!,	  Einaudi,	  Torino,	  2003,	  pp.	  161–6.	  A	  letter	  from	  a	  reader	  states	  that	  Q	  reads	  more	  like	  an	  autobiography	  of	  the	  authors.	  The	  author	  of	  the	  letter	  offers	  a	  detailed	  parallel	  between	  the	  novel	  and	  contemporary	  Italian	  history,	  from	  1970s	  lotta	  armata	  to	  1980s	  individualism.	  Also,	  a	  great	  number	  of	  (Italian	  and	  foreign)	  reviews	  of	  Q	  on	  the	  official	  Wu	  Ming	  website	  <www.wumingfoundation.com>	  insist	  on	  the	  allegorical	  element,	  which	  imposes	  a	  reading	  of	  Q’s	  story	  as	  a	  metaphor	  of	  contemporary	  political	  struggles.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Fiorella	  Iannucci,	  ‘Il	  cinquecento	  Sembra	  il	  2000’,	  Il	  messaggero,	  6	  March	  1999.	  17	  Luther	  Blissett,	  p.	  743.	  18	  See	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus,	  trans.	  Brian	  Massumi,	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  Minneapolis/London,	  1987,	  p.	  315.	  Following	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  argument,	  the	  name,	  in	  its	  expressive	  form,	  constitutes	  a	  ‘temporal	  constancy	  and	  a	  spatial	  range	  that	  make	  it	  a	  territorial,	  or	  rather	  territorializing,	  mark:	  a	  signature’.	  The	  signature	  is	  then	  a	  written,	  hence	  spatial,	  mark	  of	  human	  presence.	  This	  mark,	  understood	  as	  the	  written	  expression	  of	  the	  name,	  is	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  determining	  a	  territory,	  because	  the	  ‘trait’	  (its	  expressive	  mode)	  is	  constituted	  precisely	  as	  a	  movement	  in	  space.	  Interestingly,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  remark	  that	  the	  expressive	  quality	  of	  the	  signature	  is	  always	  in	  strict	  relation	  to	  the	  ‘possessive’.	  This	  idea	  of	  a	  territory	  marked	  by	  the	  signature	  that	  possesses	  it	  shares	  many	  points	  with	  the	  notions	  of	  name	  and	  name-­‐giver	  brought	  forward	  by	  European	  humanistic	  culture,	  which	  has,	  according	  its	  platonic	  origins,	  ascribed	  to	  the	  proper	  name	  an	  attribute	  of	  power.	  19	  For	  an	  exhaustive	  analysis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  identity	  in	  relation	  to	  singularity	  and	  multiplicity,	  see	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  The	  Coming	  Community,	  trans.	  Michael	  Hardt,	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  Minneapolis,	  2001,	  pp.	  9–23.	  20	  Luther	  Blissett,	  p.	  430.	  21	  Luther	  Blissett,	  p.	  166.	  22	  Paolo	  Virno,	  interview	  by	  ‘Conricerca’,	  21	  April	  2001,	  in	  Futuro	  anteriore.	  Dai	  Quaderni	  rossi	  ai	  movimenti	  globali:	  
ricchezze	  e	  limiti	  dell’operaismo	  Italiano,	  DeriveApprodi,	  Rome,	  2002,	  enclosed	  CD	  ROM,	  pp.	  12–13.	  23	  Virno	  interview,	  p.	  13	  24	  Franco	  Berardi	  (Bifo),	  interview	  by	  ‘Conricerca’,	  19	  November	  2000,	  in	  Futuro	  anteriore.	  Dai	  Quaderni	  rossi	  ai	  
movimenti	  globali:	  ricchezze	  e	  limiti	  dell’operaismo	  Italiano,	  DeriveApprodi,	  Rome,	  2002,	  enclosed	  CD	  ROM,	  p.	  10.	  25	  Marx,	  p.	  705.	  
